The author says that public water distribution systems are inherently vulnerable to accidental or intentional contamination events because of their distributed geography. Though major events are rare their effects can be severe both short and long term on human health. After the 9/11 attacks the US-EPA has been working with the community water systems to undertake a more comprehensive view of water safety and security and promotes the development of real-time early warning systems (EWS). The general goal of an EWS is to identify a low-probability/high-impact contamination incident while allowing sufficient time for an appropriate response that mitigates any adverse impacts. An effective deployment of an EWS may require an optimum number of online sensors ensuring adequate coverage of the network, the deployment costs are minimised and the security is maximised. Here in this paper, the criterion or objective is to minimise the the expected fraction of population exposed to contamination by properly deploying sensors in the network. The likelihood of a contamination is modeled modeled as a fixed probability distribution across junctions in a the network, which canbe used to model the likelihood of either accidental or intentional attacks.
The author mentions many technical approaches to the sensor placement problem which include integer programming, combinatorial heuristics, and general purpose metheuristics which can be applied to complex situations that can model sensor performance to detail, as well as detailed health effects. Th author though considers using an integer programming approach due to its simplicity and ability to ensure the best solution is found. The assumptions that were made to make it applicable to integer programming were:
- attack occurs at a single point in the network.
- The total population is considered exposed, without reference to specific health impacts. Without sensors in the network, a population at a node is exposed if contaminant can reahc the point in a given flow period.
- Sensors protect downstream populations. A population is considered exposed if it could be reached by a flow path from the attack point without passing a sensor.
- Transitions between time periods are ignored. Each time period is treated independently.
The objective of the model is to minimize the expected fraction of the population that is at risk for some attack. An attack is modeled as the release of a harmful contaminant at a single point in
the network with a single injection. For any particular attack, it is assumed that all points downstream of the release point connected by a set of directed flows can be contaminated. No information apriori is available on the attack site and hence a compromise solution considering all possible attack scenarios is desirable. Attack scenarios are defined by a probability distribution over all pairs of population-weighted flows and attack points. This distribution may come from expert opinions, knowledge of network defenses, location of assets within the network, degree of damage, and attackers psychology. In this paper, these are generated synthetically.
The problem is solved using a mixed-integer program. The network is represented as a graph G=(V,E); E is the set of edges represting pipes; and V is the set of nodes where the pipes meet. Nodes can be sources like reservoirs or tanks and sinks where water is consumed. Each node is associated with a region of the city and hence with some population or demand. A set of constraints and an objective function is defined which are elaborately described in the paper. The sensor-placement is evaluated experimentally using two networks from the EPANET test set and one real network. Due to non-vailability of information on population density and risk palusible sythetic data was used. The flow pattern was determined on EPANET for 4 periods of 6 hour duration each.
The datasets were run for different scenarios with varying populations and maximum amount of sensors available. Also to consider the inaccurate data different noise levels in population density and risk probabilities were considered. Three noise levels of 5, 10 and 25% noise were considered. An experiment is defined as a set of trials of the MIP model for a fixed dataset, attack scenario, noise level, and number of sensors. The experiments with the sets 1&2 consisted of 30 trials each whereas the larger set was abt 5 trials long. A detailed description of the process is given in the paper.
The results show varying sensitivity towards the noise levels which first rise and then decline. The author thinks that a plausible explanation is that the number of sensors do fall into 3 regimes and with respect to the network and the datasets. With very few sensors, the best strategy is to protect the most valuable assets. Eventually, with more sensors, there are more choices for secondary assets to protect, and these choices may be quite sensitive to variations in attack probabilites and population densities. Finally, when there are enough sensors to easily protect everything, sensors are always placed in important locations.
In conclusion, the author states that MIP based model described in the paper can be used to effectively solve large-scale sensor placement problems. He also states that the model is very simplified and can be genralised by incorporating strategies to address the temporal effects, placement locations (placing on nodes or using a mixed strategy), Sensor costs and performance objectives.
